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We are today engaged in a vigorous national debate about who is an
“employee.” The popular media regularly report on the employee status of “gig”
economy workers, such as Uber and Lyft drivers.1 The companies shaping the
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1. See, e.g., Daniel Wiessner, Uber Drivers are Contractors, not Employees, U.S. Labor
Agency Says, REUTERS (May 14, 2019, 4:04 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ubercontractors/uber-drivers-are-contractors-not-employees-us-labor-agency-says-idUSKCN1SK2FY
(discussing opinion of NLRB general counsel that Uber drivers are independent contractors, not
employees).
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gig economy insist that the individuals affiliated with their service platforms are
independent contractors.2 Some—though not all3—of the advocates for these
workers counter that these workers are, or should be treated as, employees.4 As
employees, these individuals receive the protection of federal and state statutes
regulating the terms and conditions of employment.
Parallel to, and overlapping with, this popular discussion is a body of
scholarship largely critical of the current legal definition of employee status.5
Current law, many critics maintain, is unclear, unprincipled, and overly
complex. Other critics emphasize that denying employee status to workers
improperly deprives them of the coverage of state and federal laws, such as
minimum wage statutes, workers compensation laws, and unemployment
insurance legislation.
The enactment into law of California Assembly Bill 5, commonly referred to
as “A.B.5,” is an important event in this debate.6 My assessment of A.B.5 differs
2. Id. (“San Francisco-based Uber in a statement said it is ‘focused on improving the quality
and security of independent work, while preserving the flexibility drivers and couriers tell us they
value.’”). See also Complaint at 2, Olson v. California, No. 2:19-cv-10956 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 30,
2019) [hereinafter Olson Complaint] (commenting that Uber drivers are “independent service
providers [who] have enjoyed opportunities to earn money when and where they want, with
unprecedented independence and flexibility”).
3. See, e.g., Shirin Ghaffary & Alexia F. Campbell, A Landmark Law Disrupted the Gig
Economy in California. But What Comes Next for Uber Drivers?, VOX: RECODE (Oct. 4, 2019,
2:30
PM),
https://www.vox.com/recode/2019/10/4/20898940/uber-lyft-drivers-ab5-lawcalifornia-minimum-wage-benefits-gig-economy-disrupted (“But so far, drivers’ working
conditions haven’t improved. Although many were excited about AB 5’s passing, dozens say
they’re anxious about what’s ahead, and they shared concerns about losing flexibility and continued
issues over pay in online driver groups and interviews with Recode. . . . Many drivers are worried
that because of AB 5, Uber and Lyft will limit workers’ flexibility.”); Gabrielle Canon, California’s
Controversial Labor Bill Has Passed the Senate. Experts Forecast More Worker Rights, Higher
Prices
for
Services,
USA
TODAY
(Sept.
13,
2019,
5:43
PM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2019/09/10/what-californias-ab-5-means-appslike-uber-lyft/2278936001/ (“Drivers against the legislation have raised concerns about whether
the workforce will be cut, as the companies face higher costs to come into compliance.”); Kate
Conger & Noam Scheiber, California Bill Makes App-Based Companies Treat Workers as
Employees, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 11, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/11/technology/
california-gig-economy-bill.html (“The bill was not universally supported by drivers. Some
opposed it because they worried it would make it hard to keep a flexible schedule.”).
4. See, e.g., The Am. Fed’n of Lab. and Cong. of Indus. Orgs., AFL-CIO Asserts that Gig
Economy Workers Are Employees (Mar. 1, 2016), https://aflcio.org/press/releases/afl-cio-assertsgig-economy-workers-are-employees.
5. See infra Section II.
6. See, e.g., Gabrielle Canon, California’s Lorena Gonzalez: AB 5 Champion and ‘Black
Widow
of
Public
Policy,’
USA
TODAY
(Oct.
4,
2019,
12:33
PM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2019/10/04/lorena-gonzalez-ab-5-champion-blackwidow-of-public-policy/2423465001/; Tony Marks, How Do You Spell Trouble? California AB5,
FORBES (Sept. 11, 2019, 11:52 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/tonymarks/2019/09/11/how-doyou-spell-trouble-california-ab-5/#42ae7fed7e29; Megan R. Dickey, Gig Worker Bill, AB-5,
Passes California State Senate, TECHCRUNCH (Sept. 11, 2019, 1:34 AM),
https://techcrunch.com/2019/09/10/gig-worker-bill-ab-5- passes-in-California/.
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from the evaluation advanced by the advocates and opponents of this legislation:
I conclude that A.B.5 made a significant but limited expansion of the coverage
of California labor law, but at a notable cost. Even as A.B.5 broadened the reach
of the Golden State’s labor protections, A.B.5 also made the definition of
“employee” more complex and less uniform. Those seeking federal or state
legislation like A.B.5 confront the same trade-off under which greater coverage
is achieved at the expense of more complexity and less uniformity in the
definition of who is an employee. The same political forces and policy
considerations that molded A.B.5 in California will have similar effects in other
states and in the halls of Congress.
Those who advocate expanding the coverage of laws protecting workers
herald A.B.5 as the dawn of a new day.7 By codifying the “ABC” test for
employment status, these advocates contend that A.B.5 properly extends legal
protections to the workers of the modern economy. In contrast, opponents of
A.B.5 argue that it will cripple important sectors of the U.S. economy.8
A review of A.B.5 and the background from which it emerged leads to a more
nuanced story than either of these simple narratives. For those who assert that
current law is uncertain and too complex, A.B.5 makes matters worse. A.B.5 is
replete with exceptions, exemptions, and interpretive challenges, which make
the law of employee status even more complicated and more unclear than it was
before. For those who seek expanded employment-based protection for workers
in the modern economy, the myriad exceptions and exemptions of A.B.5 are a
sober warning of the practical and political realities standing in the way of such
expansion. For those defending the status quo, A.B.5 is an equally sober
warning of considerable dissatisfaction with this status quo.
A.B.5 is thus an important data point, which indicates that those who seek to
reform the law of employee status face a trade-off: efforts to expand the coverage
of employment-based protection laws will make the law more complex and less
uniform—as did A.B.5. Given the relevant political forces and policy
considerations, legislators can broaden the reach of employment-based
regulatory laws to cover more workers in the modern economy, or they can
simplify and unify the legal definition of employee status. They cannot do both.
The first section of this Article outlines the legal background against which
A.B.5 was adopted. Whether an individual is an employee or an independent
7. See, e.g., Conger & Scheiber, supra note 3 (“Ride-hailing drivers hailed the bill’s
passage.”).
8. See id. (“Uber and Lyft have repeatedly warned that they will have to start scheduling
drivers in advance if they are employees, reducing drivers’ ability to work when and where they
want. . . . That could lead to a reduced need for drivers over all.”); see also Olson Complaint, supra
note 2, at 7 (stating that the goal of the A.B.5 sponsors “is to deprive workers of the flexibility and
freedom of their current independent status”); Ghaffary & Campbell, supra note 3 (“Uber and Lyft
have responded that more expensive and restrictive labor standards would force them to make these
kinds of changes [such as requiring drivers to schedule shifts] to effectively run their businesses.”);
Canon, supra note 6 (quoting Ryan Vet as saying that A.B.5 will “implode the gig economy as we
know it today”); Marks, supra note 6 (“This is a potential neutron bomb under AB-5.”).
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contractor plays critical, though different, roles in various areas of the law. In
this first section, I explore and contrast these roles in three important legal
arenas: taxes, torts, and regulatory protection. As part of this discussion, I
identify the law’s four basic definitions of employee status: the common law
control test; the increasingly popular ABC test, which was incorporated into
A.B.5; the standard of “economic realities”; and the concept of statutory
purpose.
The second section of this Article explores the legal literature in this area.
Central to this literature are the critiques of the current law of employee status
as too complicated, too opaque, and too limited. Against this background, the
third section describes A.B.5 as enacted into law. Central to A.B.5 are the many
exemptions and exceptions embodied in this statute and the interpretive
challenges raised by those exemptions and exceptions as well as by the ABC test
itself.
The third section of this Article evaluates A.B.5 in light of the background
against which A.B.5 was adopted. A.B.5 is neither the panacea some of its
advocates maintain nor the tragedy its opponents bemoan. This section
emphasizes four features of A.B.5, which cumulatively make the law of
employee status even more complex and less uniform than it was before. First,
A.B.5 incorporates the ABC test, which has its interpretative challenges. These
ambiguities include the “control” standard,9 which the ABC inquiry borrows
from the common law, as well as such contestable notions as whether a worker
is “customarily engaged in an independently established trade, occupation, or
business”10 and “the usual course of the hiring entity’s business.”11
Second, A.B.5 is replete with exemptions and exceptions, the boundaries of
which are often opaque. Third, the drafters of A.B.5 made the unfortunate
choice of incorporating by reference an important decision of the California
Supreme Court—S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Department of Industrial
Relations—rather than stating in explicit statutory terms the rule the drafters
believe Borello embodies.12 Fourth, A.B.5 has no impact on an individual’s
status as an employee for tort purposes and has an inconsistent impact on an
individual’s status as an employee for state income tax purposes. It is thus
possible, for example, for an individual to be deemed to be an employee under
A.B.5 for purposes of the Golden State’s employment-based protection laws
while remaining an independent contractor for the tort rule of respondeat
superior.

9. Cal. Assemb. B. 5 § 2, 2019–20 Leg. Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019) (adding § 2750.3(a)(1)(A) to
the California Labor Code).
10. Id. (adding § 2750.3(a)(1)(C) to the California Labor Code).
11. Id. (adding § 2750.3(a)(1)(B) to the California Labor Code).
12. A.B.5: Cal. Assemb. B. 5 § 2 (adding § 2750(a)(3), incorporating S.G. Borello & Sons by
reference); S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Dep’t of Indus. Rel., 769 P.2d 399 (Cal. 1989).
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Those seeking to expand the coverage of employment-based protective
legislation can count A.B.5 as a significant, but limited, victory. Those seeking
to simplify, clarify, and unify the law cannot.
The last section of this Article discusses the ongoing debate about employee
status going forward from A.B.5. The political forces and policy considerations
that molded A.B.5 will be the same in other states and in Congress as they
grapple in the years ahead with the legal definition of employment. A.B.5 makes
clear that state and federal legislators will confront a trade-off. They can expand
the coverage of employment-based regulatory laws to cover more workers in the
modern economy, or they can simplify and unify the legal definition of
employee status. They cannot do both. Indeed, efforts to enlarge the coverage
of protective legislation will make the law of employee status more complex and
less uniform—as did A.B.5. The political forces and policy considerations that
shaped A.B.5 in the California legislature will be at play on Capitol Hill and in
the legislatures of the other forty-nine states.
A.B.5 might suggest to some the need to scrap altogether the distinction
between employees and independent contractors. For others, A.B.5 and its
complexities might suggest that the prospect of simplification of the law in this
area was always a chimera.
Two generations ago, Professor Charles E. Lindblom famously catalogued the
benefits of “muddling through.”13 Some problems do not lend themselves to
neat and comprehensive solutions. A.B.5 confirms that the legal definition of
employment is one of these. It would be attractive if the legal definition of who
is an employee could be simplified and made more uniform. But as A.B.5
demonstrates, this is not in the cards nor should it be, given the various functions
that employee status plays in different areas of the law and the contending policy
and political pressures molding the law in this area.
Whatever the merits of A.B.5 might be, uniformity, simplicity, and certainty
are not among these. Those who seek to emulate A.B.5 will confront the same
trade-off as did the legislators of the Golden State. The definition of “employee”
can be made simpler and more uniform, or it can be broadened to include more
workers in the modern economy. But A.B.5 indicates the trade-off between
these two prescriptions for the legal definition of employment. “Muddling
through” was the past and is the future of the law of employee status, given the
political influences and policy concerns that will mold federal and state
legislation in this area.

13. Charles E. Lindblom, The Science of “Muddling Through”, 19 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 79
(1959).
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I. WHO IS AN EMPLOYEE? COMPARING THE CONTEXTS AND THE TESTS
A. Overview
This section introduces and compares the four basic tests for determining an
individual’s status as an employee rather than an independent contractor: the
common law control test; the ABC test; the “economic realities” standard; and
inquiry into statutory purpose. This section explores these tests in the context
of three important areas of law in which status as an employee carries significant
legal consequences: taxes, torts, and protective legislation. In the tax context,
status as an employee shifts tax-withholding obligations to the employer, and it
also makes available certain benefits limited to taxpayers in their respective
capacities as employees. In the tort setting, classifying an individual as an
employee extends liability to her employer under the doctrine of respondeat
superior. In the context of employment-based protective legislation, a
characterization of an individual as an employee triggers the coverage of such
legislation while classifying that person as an independent contractor places her
beyond such protection.14
B. Federal Taxes and the Common Law Definition of Employment
In the federal tax context, whether an individual is classified as an “employee”
is determined under what is today often designated as the common law test of
employment. For purposes of payroll (FICA) taxation, the Internal Revenue
Code defines an “employee” as “any individual who, under the usual common
law rules applicable in determining the employer-employee relationship, has the
status of an employee . . . .”15 The Treasury Regulations implementing this
statute emphasize that the touchstone for determining status as a common law
employee is control, namely, whether “the person for whom services are
performed has the right to control and direct the individual who performs the
services, not only as to the result to be accomplished by the work but also as to
the details and means by which that result is accomplished.”16
The Treasury Regulations define employee status for wage withholding
purposes in essentially identical, control-oriented terms,17 adding the caveat that
14. There are many other areas of the law where the concept of being an “employee” is
crucial. For example, in copyright law, the status of a worker as an employee vel non may
determine whether the worker’s creation belongs to the worker or to the employer who hired her.
See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining “work made for hire” as “a work prepared by an employee within
the scope of his or her employment”); see also Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S.
730, 741 (1989) (“[T]he term ‘employee’ should be understood in light of the general common law
of agency.”). Nevertheless, for purposes of analyzing the background against which A.B.5 was
adopted, the most useful areas of the law to examine are taxes, torts, and protective regulation.
15. I.R.C. § 3121(d)(2). The Code also incorporates this definition under the Federal
Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA). See I.R.C. § 3306(i).
16. Treas. Reg. § 31.3121(d)-1(c)(2) (as amended in 1980).
17. Treas. Reg. § 31.3401(c)-1(b) (as amended in 1970).
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“[g]enerally, physicians, lawyers, dentists, veterinarians, contractors,
subcontractors, public stenographers, auctioneers, and others who follow an
independent trade, business, or profession, in which they offer their services to
the public, are not employees.”18
In Revenue Ruling 87-41, the IRS identifies twenty factors to be considered
when assessing the existence vel non of control for purposes of classifying
workers as employees or independent contractors under the common law test.19
This administrative ruling and its twenty-factor test reveal the fact-specific
nature of the common law control test. The ruling itself acknowledges the
uncertainties of the twenty-factor standard:
The degree of importance of each factor varies depending on the
occupation and the factual context in which the services are
performed. The twenty factors are designed only as guides for
determining whether an individual is an employee; special scrutiny is
required in applying the twenty factors to assure that formalistic
aspects of an arrangement designed to achieve a particular status do
not obscure the substance of the arrangement . . . .20
After acknowledging that the twenty-factor test is fact—and context—
dependent, Revenue Ruling 87-41 enumerates these factors: (1) whether a
worker must comply with “instructions about when, where, and how he or she
is to work”; (2) whether a worker is required to undergo training; (3) whether a
worker is “[i]ntegrat[ed] . . . into the business operations” for which he or she
works; (4) whether the services to be performed by an individual “must be
rendered personally” by that individual; (5) whether the individual whose
employment status is being determined “hires, supervises, and pays” others; (6)
whether there is “[a] continuing relationship between the worker and the person
or persons for whom the services are performed”; (7) whether the person whose
status as an employee vel non is being determined has “set hours of work”
established for him or her; (8) whether the work is full-time or not; (9) whether
the work is performed on the employee’s premises or “on the premises of the
person or persons for whom the services are performed”; (10) whether “a worker
must perform services in the order or sequence set by the person or persons for
whom the services are performed”; (11) whether “the worker [must] submit
regular or written reports to the person or persons for whom the services are
performed”; (12) whether the person whose employment status is being
determined is paid “by the hour, week, or month” or is instead paid “a lump sum
agreed upon as the cost of a job”; (13) whether the worker or the service
purchaser “pay[s] the worker’s business and/or traveling expenses”; (14)
whether the worker furnishes his or her own “tools, materials, and other
equipment”; (15) whether “the worker invests in facilities that are used by the
18. Id. § 31.3401(c)-1(c).
19. Rev. Rul. 87-41, 1987-1 C.B. 296, at 10–18.
20. Id. at 10–11.
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worker in performing services”; (16) whether the individual whose employment
status is being determined “can realize a profit or suffer a loss as a result of the
worker’s services (in addition to the profit or loss ordinarily realized by
employees)”; (17) whether an individual works “for [m]ore [t]han [o]ne [f]irm
at a [t]ime”; (18) whether “a worker makes his or her services available to the
general public on a regular and consistent basis”; (19) whether the service
purchaser has “(t)he right to discharge a worker . . . indicating that the worker is
an employee and the person possessing the right is an employer”; and (20)
whether “the worker has the right to end his or her relationship with the person
for whom the services are performed at any time he or she wishes without
incurring liability.”21
In addition to triggering an employer’s obligation to withhold taxes from an
employee, employee status also determines whether an individual is eligible for
the many tax benefits tied to this status. Most prominently, the Internal Revenue
Code’s exclusion of health insurance premiums from the gross income of the
insured depends upon the insured being an employee of the entity paying the
premiums.22
Critics of the common law control test of employee status disparaged this factbased, multifactored standard as indeterminate even before the rise of the socalled “gig” economy.23 That indeterminacy is compounded by the emergence
of newer economic relationships driven by such contemporary phenomenon as
internet platforms and telecommuting.24
C. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company v. Darden: The U.S. Supreme
Court Embraces the Common Law Control Test
Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company v. Darden is the U.S. Supreme
Court’s most recent decision on the definition of an employee.25 For purposes
of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA),26 the Court
embraced the common law control test as reflecting congressional intent, even
as the Court acknowledged the imprecision of that test.27
Mr. Darden had been an exclusive insurance agent for Nationwide.28 As such
an agent, he participated in Nationwide’s “Agent’s Security Compensation

21. Id. at 11–18.
22. I.R.C. § 106(a). See also I.R.C. § 132 (conditioning a variety of exclusions from gross
income upon the taxpayer’s status as an employee).
23. See, e.g., Marc Linder, What Is an Employee? Why It Does, But Should Not, Matter, 7 L.
& INEQ. 155, 158 (1989).
24. See discussion infra Section IV.B.
25. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323–25 (1992).
26. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 §
3(6) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.).
27. Darden, 503 U.S. at 323–25.
28. Id. at 320.
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Plan.”29 After Nationwide terminated its relationship with Mr. Darden, he sold
insurance policies for Nationwide’s competitors.30 Nationwide thereupon
claimed that Mr. Darden’s activities on behalf of Nationwide’s competitors
caused Mr. Darden to forfeit his deferred compensation benefits under this
retirement plan.31 Mr. Darden responded that such forfeiture violated his rights
under ERISA.32 As a statutory matter, Mr. Darden could assert rights under
ERISA only if he had been an employee of Nationwide.33 Nationwide argued
that he was not.34
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that Mr. Darden might
have been an employee for ERISA purposes.35 The appeals court observed that
ERISA’s statutory definition of an “employee”—"any individual employed by
an employer”—"provides little guidance.” 36 Moreover, under “the traditional
common-law standard,” Mr. Darden “most probably would not qualify as an
employee” of Nationwide.37 That common law standard examines “[m]any
factors” to determine whether the putative employer, Nationwide, has the “right
to direct and control the performance of” the alleged employee, that is, Mr.
Darden.38
However, the appeals court reasoned, the multifactor common law test of
control was “not the appropriate standard” for determining employee status
under ERISA.39 Instead, “the definition of ‘employee’ should be tailored to the
purposes of the statute being construed.”40 On remand, the appeals court held
that Mr. Darden should be allowed to present evidence that classifying him as

29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 321. To invoke ERISA’s civil remedies provision, an individual must be a
“participant” in a plan. Being a “participant,” in turn, requires that the individual be an “employee”
of the firm establishing the plan. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(6) (defining “employee” for ERISA
purposes); 29 U.S.C. § 1002(7) (defining “participant” for ERISA purposes); 29 U.S.C. §
1132(a)(1)(B) (establishing a “participant[‘s]” cause of action). For further discussion, see JOHN
H. LANGBEIN ET. AL., PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW 99–103, 712, 714–16 (6th ed. 2015)
(discussing ERISA’s definitions of “employee” and “participant,” as well as the participant’s right
to sue under ERISA § 502); LAWRENCE A. FROLIK & KATHRYN L. MOORE, LAW OF EMPLOYEE
PENSION AND WELFARE BENEFITS 66–81, 415–29 (3d ed. 2010) (discussing ERISA’s definition of
“employee” and the participant’s right to sue under ERISA § 502).
34. Darden, 503 U.S. at 320.
35. Darden v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company, 796 F.2d 701, 709 (4th Cir. 1986).
36. Id. at 704. See also 29 U.S.C. § 1002(6).
37. Id. at 704–05.
38. Id. at 705.
39. Id. at 706.
40. Id.
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an employee, rather than an independent contractor, would advance “the
objectives and purposes of ERISA.”41
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, holding that the common law test of control
informed by principles of agency law was the appropriate standard for
determining employee status under ERISA.42 ERISA’s statutory definition of
an “‘employee’ as ‘any individual employed by an employer’ is completely
circular and explains nothing.’”43 Under these circumstances, “a common law
test” of employee status is proper for ERISA purposes.44 That test, animated by
“traditional agency law principles,” is a multifactored inquiry focused upon the
alleged employer’s right to control the asserted employee.45 Among other
authorities, the Supreme Court cited Revenue Ruling 87-41 as “setting forth 20
factors as guides in determining whether an individual qualifies as a commonlaw ‘employee’ in various tax law contexts.”46
ERISA’s “circular” definition of “employee,” the Court observed, contrasts
with the broader language of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).47 The FLSA
defines “employ” as meaning “to suffer or permit to work.”48 This statutory
language is of “striking breadth” and “stretches the [FLSA’s] meaning of
‘employee’ to cover some parties who might not qualify as such under a strict
application of traditional agency law principles.”49
“To be sure,” the Darden court acknowledged with considerable
understatement, “the traditional agency law criteria offer no paradigm of
determinacy.”50 However, such a fact-intensive, common law approach to
employee status should prevail for ERISA purposes.
Central to the high court’s analysis was its perception of congressional intent.
In concluding that the definition of an employee for ERISA purposes should be
gleaned from ERISA’s statutory purposes, the Court of Appeals cited the high
court’s opinions in NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., in which the Court
defined the term “employee” under the National Labor Relations Act,51 and
United States v. Silk, where the Court defined “employee” under the Social

41. Id. at 707, 709. This purpose-based approach to employee status has venerable roots. See,
e.g., Lehigh Valley Coal Co. v. Yensavage, 218 F. 547, 552–53 (2d Cir. 1914) (stating in a majority
opinion by Judge Learned Hand that employee status “must be understood with reference to the
purpose of the act”).
42. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323–25 (1992).
43. Darden, 503 U.S. at 323. See also 29 U.S.C. § 1002(6).
44. Darden, 503 U.S. at 323.
45. Id. at 323–24.
46. Id. at 324.
47. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219.
48. 29 U.S.C. §§ 203(e)(1), (g).
49. Darden, 503 U.S. at 326.
50. Id. at 327.
51. NLRB v. Hearst Publ’ns, 322 U.S. 111, 120–29 (1944); see also Darden v. Nationwide
Mutual Insurance Company, 796 F.2d 701, 706 (4th Cir. 1986) (citing to Hearst Publ’ns).
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Security Act.52 Both of these decisions defined the term “employee” more
“broad[ly] than the common-law definition.”53 Congress responded to these two
opinions by amending the statutes in question to endorse, in lieu of a broader
definition of “employee” geared toward statutory purpose, “the usual commonlaw principles” defining who is an employee based on a multifactor control
test.54
We see in Darden several of the themes that govern the discussion in this area
of the law. None of the possible tests for employee status is a “paradigm of
determinacy.”55 Multifactor tests never are, but neither are inquiries into
statutory purpose or “control.” Focusing on “control” for employment purposes
requires determination of how much control is necessary to shift an individual’s
status from an independent contractor to an employee. Another formulation of
employee status—"economic realities” under the “suffer or permit” standard—
is understood to be broader than the common law test, but it is no model of
determinacy either. Indeed, applied literally, the “suffer or permit” test could
include the universe of independent contractor relationships—a result no one
thinks is sensible under the FLSA or under other laws regulating employment
that use the “suffer or permit” test to define who is an employee.56
D. S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Department of Industrial Relations: Control
and Statutory Purpose as Touchstones of Employee Status
In S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Department of Industrial Relations,57 the
California Supreme Court, over dissent,58 held that “sharefarmers,” who
harvested cucumbers for a grower, were the grower’s employees rather than
independent contractors for purposes of California’s Workers’ Compensation
Act (“the Act”).59 Central to the Borello court’s holding was the control
exercised by the grower over the sharefarmers and the court’s perception of the
purposes of the Act.60
The Borello court observed that the common law rule tying employee status
to the control exercised over the employee originally arose in the tort context of

52. United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704, 713–14 (1947); see also Darden, 796 F.2d at 706
(citing to Silk).
53. Darden, 503 U.S. at 324–25.
54. Id. New York’s Court of Appeals has recently taken a similar approach in determining
that a delivery courier working through a digital platform was an “employee” for unemployment
insurance purposes. See Matter of Vega, 149 N.E.3d 401, 405–06 (N.Y. 2020).
55. Darden, 503 U.S. at 327.
56. For examples of other laws, see, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 50-4-21(A) (“‘[E]mploy’
includes suffer or permit to work . . . .”); TENN. CODE ANN. §50-2-201(2) (LexisNexis 2020)
(“‘Employ’ includes to suffer or permit to work . . . .”).
57. S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Dep’t Indus. Rels., 769 P.2d 399 (Cal. 1989).
58. Id. at 410–11 (Kaufman, J., dissenting).
59. Id. at 346; see also CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 3200–4386 (Deering 2020).
60. Borello, 769 P.2d at 404, 406–08.
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“vicarious liability.”61 If a person has the “right to control” the “activities”
performed for him by another, it is compelling for tort purposes to designate the
controlling person as the “employer,” liable for “the misconduct of [the] person
rendering service to” the employer.62
Protective legislation, such as
unemployment-compensation laws and workers’ compensation statutes,
subsequently incorporated the distinction between employees controlled by
others (covered by such legislation) and independent contractors (not so
covered). In light of this history, “the right to control work details is the ‘most
important’ or ‘most significant’ consideration” when determining whether or not
service providers are employees protected as such by employment-based laws.63
But, according to Borello, this “right to control work” is not the only
consideration. In determining whether or not a service provider is an employee
for purposes of protective legislation, the existence vel non of control must be
supplemented by other “‘secondary’ indicia” as well as by “the ‘history and
fundamental purposes’ of the statute” in question.64 Accordingly, “under the
Act, the ‘control-of-work-details’ test for determining whether a person
rendering service to another is an ‘employee’ or an excluded ‘independent
contractor’ must be applied with deference to the purposes of the protective
legislation.”65
Utilizing this two-part test based on control and statutory purpose, the Borello
court concluded that the sharefarmers working for the cucumber grower were
employees of the grower for purposes of the Act rather than independent
contractors. The grower in Borello “retains all necessary control over the
harvest option of its operations.”66 In addition, coverage of the sharefarmers as
employees under the Act facilitates the “public purpose” of the Act of
“recogni[zing] that if the financial risk of job injuries is not placed upon the
businesses which produce them, it may fall upon the public treasury.”67
E. Dynamex Operations West, Inc. v. The Superior Court of Los Angeles
County: California’s Supreme Court Adopts the ABC Test
The California Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in Dynamex Operations
West, Inc. v. The Superior Court of Los Angeles County contrasts with Borello
and reflects the growth at the state level of what has come to be called the “ABC
test” for employee status.68

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id. at 403.
Id.
Id. at 404.
Id. at 404–05.
Id. at 406.
Id. at 408.
Id. at 409.
Dynamex Operations W., Inc. v. Superior Court, 416 P.3d 1, 35 (Cal. 2018).
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Dynamex operates a one-day delivery service throughout the nation, including
in California.69 While Dynamex previously treated its drivers as employees,
since 2004 Dynamex has characterized its drivers as “independent contractors .
. . requir[ing them] to provide their own vehicles and pay for all of their
transportation expenses . . . .”70 Dynamex drivers can hire their own personnel
to deliver Dynamex packages.71 When not delivering for Dynamex, drivers can
work for competitive services or can operate their own personal delivery
services.72
Ultimately, the plaintiff class in Dynamex was limited to those drivers who
worked exclusively for Dynamex by themselves.73 This limitation excluded
from the plaintiff class those Dynamex drivers who hired their own personnel or
who also made deliveries for a Dynamex competitor or for their own account.
The substantive issue posed was whether Dynamex drivers who exclusively
worked by themselves for Dynamex were, as Dynamex contended, independent
contractors, or whether for purposes of the California “wage order” governing
the transportation industry,74 such drivers were instead Dynamex employees.75
The California wage order governs employees in the transportation industry
and prescribes for them such working conditions as minimum wages and
maximum hours.76 The wage order, in language similar to the federal FLSA,77
defines the term “employ” to “mean[] to engage, suffer, or permit to work.”78
Rather than the “economic realities” test, which the courts have developed under
FLSA,79 the California court in Dynamex decreed that the “suffer or permit to
work” standard should be understood as incorporating what has come to be
called the “‘ABC’ test” for employee status.80
Under this test, individuals are presumed to be employees (rather than
independent contractors) of the person for whom they are hired to work.81 To
overcome that presumption, and thereby establish the legal status of independent
contractor, all prongs of a three-part ABC test must be satisfied.82 Prong A of
69. Id. at 8.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 9.
74. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 8 § 11090 (2020).
75. Dynamex, 416 P.3d at 5.
76. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 8, § 11090(3)–(4).
77. 29 U.S.C. § 203(g).
78. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 8, § 11090.2(D).
79. See, e.g., Acosta v. Jani-King of Okla., Inc., 905 F.3d 1156, 1160 (10th Cir. 2018).
80. Dynamex, 416 P.3d at 34–35. The states have adapted the ABC test even as they have
embraced it. See Anna Deknatel & Lauren Hoff-Downing, ABC on the Books and in the Courts:
An Analysis of Recent Independent Contractor and Misclassification Statutes, 18 U. PA. J.L. &
SOC. CHANGE 53, 64–74 (2015).
81. See Cal. Assemb. B. 5 § 2 (adding § 2750.3(a)(1) to the California Labor Code).
82. Dynamex, 416 P.3d at 34.
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this three-part test to avoid an employer-employee relationship is that the person
for whom work is performed has neither legal nor practical control of the person
performing such work.83 The second component, denoted as prong B, that must
be proved to establish an independent contractor relationship is “that the worker
performs work that is outside the usual course of the hiring entity’s business.”84
Prong C of the ABC test is that the individual claiming to be an independent
contractor must be “customarily engaged in an independently established trade,
occupation, or business of the same nature as that involved in the work
performed” by that individual for the person who hired her.85 Because of the
presumption of employee status, all three elements of the ABC test must
affirmatively be satisfied to overcome such presumption and thereby establish
an independent contractor relationship.86
The term ABC test is something of a misnomer. In important respects, the
most important component of this standard is the preliminary point that might
be designated as element “D”: Under the ABC rubric, there is a presumption of
employee status—a presumption that is overcome only if all facets of the threepart ABC test are affirmatively proven. A more accurate, if less catchy, label
for the ABC test would be “strong presumption of employee status.”
A major challenge for the Dynamex court was distinguishing its embrace of
the ABC test for employee status in light of Borello’s two-part standard for such
status, control, and statutory purpose. Dynamex met this challenge by focusing
upon Borello’s discussion of statutory purpose to the exclusion of Borello’s
comments about control:
[A]lthough we have sometimes characterized Borello as embodying
the common law control test or standard for distinguishing employees
and independent contractors, it appears more precise to describe
Borello as calling for resolution of the employee or independent
contractor question by focusing on the intended scope and purposes of
the particular statutory provision or provisions at issue. In other
words, Borello calls for application of a statutory purpose standard . .
. .87
This retrospective realignment88 of Borello enabled the Dynamex Court to
embrace the ABC test for employee status under the California wage order as a
better implementation of “the history and purpose” of that order.89
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 35.
87. Id. at 19 (citation omitted).
88. See EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING vii, 7–8 (1948) (ebook)
(discussing the manner in which courts “realign” their precedents to modify legal doctrine while
simultaneously executing “the duty of the American judge to view the law as a fairly consistent
whole.”).
89. Dynamex, 416 P.3d at 35.
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F. The Restatement of Agency: Respondeat Superior and the Common Law
Control Test
For purposes of the tort rule of respondeat superior, the Restatement of
Agency endorses the common law control test for status as an employee: “an
employee is an agent whose principal controls or has the right to control the
manner and means of the agent’s performance of work . . . .”90
The Restatement justifies this traditional control-based definition of
employment in efficiency terms: “[a]n employer’s ability to exercise control
over its employees’ work-related conduct enables the employer to take measures
to reduce the incidence of tortious conduct.”91 The Restatement, like Revenue
Ruling 87-41, lists many factors relevant to determining whether an individual
is an employee or not. Unsurprisingly, this nonexclusive list overlaps with
Revenue Ruling’s 87-41’s multifactor test for common law employment status:
[T]he extent of control that the agent and the principal have agreed the
principal may exercise over details of the work; whether the agent is
engaged in a distinct occupation or business; whether the type of work
done by the agent is customarily done under a principal’s direction or
without supervision; the skill required in the agent’s occupation;
whether the agent or the principal supplies the tools and other
instrumentalities required for the work and the place in which to
perform it; the length of time during which the agent is engaged by a
principal; whether the agent is paid by the job or by the time worked;
whether the agent’s work is part of the principal’s regular business;
whether the principal and the agent believe that they are creating an
employment relationship; and whether the principal is or is not in
business. Also relevant is the extent of control that the principal has
exercised in practice over the details of the agent’s work.92
Further reflecting the overlap in this area, the Reporter’s Notes cite both the
Internal Revenue Code and Darden as authorities for the fact-intensive common
law control test of employment.93
G. Conclusion
Darden, Borello, and Dynamex, as well as the relevant provisions of the tax
law and of the Restatement of Agency, provide important background for
discussion of the law of employee status and, ultimately, the adoption of A.B.5.
As these materials indicate, the concept of employee status plays a different role
in different contexts. In the tax setting, classification of an individual as an
employee shifts tax-withholding responsibilities to the employer hiring that
individual and makes available certain tax benefits tied to employee status. For
90.
91.
92.
93.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.07(3)(a) (AM. LAW INST. 2006).
Id. § 7.07 cmt. b.
Id. § 7.07 cmt. f.
Id. § 7.07 rep.’s notes f.
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tort law purposes, an individual’s status as an employee extends liability for the
individual’s actions to her employer under the heading of respondeat superior.
In the regulatory context, characterizing an individual as an employee triggers
the protections of the law. In Darden, Mr. Darden’s ability to invoke the
protections of ERISA depended on whether he was an employee of Nationwide.
In Borello, employee status caused sharefarmers to be covered by California’s
Workers’ Compensation Act. In Dynamex, the California wage order covering
conditions in the transportation industry applied to selected Dynamex personnel
because they were classified as employees and were thus covered by the wage
order.
Four major tests have evolved to determine whether an individual is an
employee rather than an independent contractor: the common law control test,
the “ABC” standard, the “economic realities” test, and inquiry into statutory
purposes. As we shall see in the next section of this Article, commentators have
largely been critical of the law in this area.
II. COMMENTARY
In this section, I explore the commentary in this area. The relevant literature
advances a variety of themes and proposals, largely critical of the current law of
employee status. Among these criticisms are the imprecise nature of the
multifactor common law control test, particularly in the context of the modern
“gig economy,” the alleged failure of contemporary law to extend employmentbased protection to individuals who need such protection, the desirability of
adopting a third category to stand midway between status as an employee and
status as an independent contractor, the creation of a presumption of employee
status, the alleged need to increase penalties for employers that misclassify
employees as independent contractors, and the need for definitions of employee
status that are more simple and more uniform. As I argue infra, A.B.5 indicates
the tension among these concerns: expanding the coverage of employmentbased protection will make the law more complex and less uniform—as did
A.B.5.
Professor Marc Linder attacks current law as both imprecise and failing to
protect workers who deserve the protection of laws regulating the workplace.94
Statutes governing “unemployment compensation, workers compensation,
collective bargaining rights, minimum wages and maximum hours, social
security, pensions, occupational safety and health, and anti-discrimination
protection” only cover “employees,” not independent contractors.95 “What an
employee is, however, has often been left vague,” leaving current law, according
to Professor Linder, a “hodgepodge” with “[n]o sound theoretical or empirical”
justification.96
94. Linder, supra note 23, at 158.
95. Id.
96. Id.
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Professor Linder focuses upon “[t]wo rival tests” for defining whether “the
employment relationship” exists: “the more restrictive control test and the more
expansive economic reality of dependence test.”97 However, he concludes
neither test generates “a principled position to distinguish between employers
and independent contractors.”98 In the interest of greater legal uniformity and
protection, Professor Linder suggests borrowing from certain foreign legal
systems a third category for workers, “dependent contractors.”99
Professors Seth D. Harris and Alan B. Krueger, writing under the auspices of
The Hamilton Project, similarly support a third category for participants in the
gig economy to be denoted as “independent worker.”100 Uber and Lyft drivers
would be the prototypical “independent workers,”101 participants in the online
economy who occupy “a middle ground” between employee and independent
contractor status.102 Professors Harris and Krueger tell us that the problematic
legal situation of gig economy workers stems from the unsettled nature of
current law that consists of “collections of factors for consideration rather than
clear thresholds or required elements.”103 Moreover, the emerging economic
relationships of the modern economy do not fit the either/or choice of
employment v. independent contracting: “the existing employee-independent
contractor dichotomy does not offer a satisfying or reliable path in these new
and emerging circumstances.”104
To address these novel conditions, Professors Harris and Krueger call for
federal and state legislation to create a new category of “independent worker.”105
Independent workers, like employees, would have the legal right to organize and
bargain collectively106 and would be protected by anti-discrimination laws.107
For income tax and FICA purposes, independent workers would be treated in
the same way as employees, that is, subject to withholding and employer
contributions.108 However, such an independent worker would not receive
“other protections and benefits, such as overtime protection or unemployment
insurance.”109
97. Id. at 172.
98. Id. at 175.
99. Id. at 185–86.
100. Seth D. Harris & Alan B. Krueger, A Proposal for Modernizing Labor Laws for TwentyFirst-Century Work: The “Independent Worker”, BROOKINGS: THE HAMILTON PROJECT 5 (2015)
https://www.hamiltonproject.org/assets/files/modernizing_labor_laws_for_twenty_first_
century_work_krueger_harris.pdf.
101. Id. at 5, 9.
102. Id. at 9.
103. Id. at 6.
104. Id. at 8.
105. Id. at 5.
106. Id. at 15–17.
107. Id. at 17–18.
108. Id. at 18–19.
109. Id. at 19.
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In contrast, Professor Miriam A. Cherry and Doctor Antonio Aloisi are
skeptical of such third categories as “dependent contractors.”110 After exploring
the experiences with such third categories in Canada, Spain, and Italy, they
conclude that “fairness for workers” instead requires a “default rule” of
“employee status or something that, at the very least, resembles it closely.”111
Professor Cherry and Doctor Aloisi also highlight the status of workers “in
the ‘gig,’ ‘on-demand’ ‘platform,’ or ‘sharing’ economy.”112 For these and other
workers, employee status is necessary for them to receive the protection of
minimum wage laws, anti-discrimination statutes, state unemployment
compensation systems, and worker’s compensation laws.113 The common law
control test as well as the economic realities standard, they argue, “are
notoriously malleable, difficult, and fact-dependent,”114 leading to
“indeterminate legal outcome[s].”115
However, based on the Canadian, Spanish, and Italian experiences with
intermediate categories between “employee” and “independent contractor,”
Professor Cherry and Doctor Aloisi conclude that such categories entail their
own “potential for misclassification, arbitrage, and confusion.”116 They instead
suggest creating a general presumption of employee status: “above a minimum
threshold of hours worked, the default classification would be an employment
relationship.”117
In a similar vein, Professor Christopher Buscaglia calls for substantive and
procedural legislation to force more workers to be treated as employees.118 From
his perspective, the core problem stems from the “common law factors” for
employee status as reflected in “the IRS 20-factor test.”119 He calls for laws
providing “a clear and unambiguous definition of ‘independent contractor[,]’”
as well as legislation which “directly punishes acts of misclassification by
employers.”120
Citing studies indicating that many employees are misclassified as
independent contractors,121 Professor Buscaglia calls for legislation providing a

110. Miriam A. Cherry & Antonio Aloisi, “Dependent Contractors” in the Gig Economy: A
Comparative Approach, 66 AM. U.L. REV. 635, 637, 640 (2017).
111. Id. at 693–40.
112. Id. at 641.
113. Id. at 642.
114. Id. at 642–43.
115. Id. at 645.
116. Id. at 681.
117. Id. at 683.
118. Christopher Buscaglia, Crafting a Legislative Solution to the Economic Harm of
Employee Misclassification, 9 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 111, 113 (2009).
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 114–19.
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“uniform” definition of “independent contractor . . . for all purposes.”122 This
definition would eschew “multi-factor tests like the ‘right to control’ or the IRS
test, which are difficult to apply and do not lead to consistent and predictable
outcomes.”123
Instead, under Professor Buscaglia’s uniform definition of “independent
contractor,” an individual would, as a substantive matter, be deemed to be an
independent contractor only if each of nine criteria are satisfied.124 Under this
proposal, an individual would be an independent contractor only if she: “(i)
maintains a separate business with the individual’s own business location,
equipment, materials, and other facilities”‘125 “(ii) holds or has applied for a
federal employer identification number or has filed business or self-employment
tax returns with the Internal Revenue Service”;126 “(iii) operates under contracts
to perform specific services for specific amounts of money”;127 “(iv) incurs the
expenses related to the service performed under the contract”;128 “(v) is
personally liable for the failure to complete the service”;129 “(vi) receives
compensation for services performed under a contract on a commission or perjob basis and not on any other basis”;130 “(vii) may realize a profit or suffer a
loss under a contract to perform service”;131 “(viii) has continuing and/or
recurrent business liabilities and obligations”;132 and “(ix) the success or failure
of the individual’s business depends on the relationship of business receipts to
expenditures.”133 Under this proposed test, “[i]f proof of any one factor is
deficient, the worker is deemed an employee.”134
Procedurally under Professor Buscaglia’s proposed regime, a hiring entity
must seek certification in advance that a person to be hired as an independent
contractor satisfies all nine of these criteria.135 Professor Buscaglia would
bolster his regime with personal liability similar to the “responsible person”

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Id. at 130.
Id.
Id. at 130–31.
Id. at 130.
Id. at 131.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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provisions that impose payroll tax136 and sales tax137 responsibilities upon
corporate officers and individuals.138 If an employer flouts the rules pertaining
to alleged individual contractors, strict civil liability and potential criminal
penalties would be imposed upon the responsible corporate officer or LLC
manager.139
The presumption of employee status and harsher penalties for
misclassification are echoed in a student note that compares Indiana’s treatment
of employees and independent contractors with the laws of other states.140 Like
other critiques of current law, this note criticizes the “lack of uniformity” in the
law’s various tests of employee status and “the complexity of the tests.”141
Among its remedies, this note proposes a private right of action under which an
individual misclassified as an independent contractor could recover the “‘wages,
salary, employment benefits, or other compensation denied or lost’” as a result
of such misclassification.142 In addition, this note proposes that civil penalties
be imposed on employers who misclassify employees as independent
contractors143 and that the states establish a presumption of employee status.144
Dean David Weil describes what he calls the “fissured workplace.”145 In an
earlier era, most workers had a “direct employment relationship”146 “with a
single, well-defined employer with direct responsibility in hiring and firing,
managing, training, compensation, and development of its workforce.”147
Today, in contrast, functions and relationships previously conducted by a single,
136. I.R.C. § 6672 (providing statutory basis for responsible person liability). See also Slodov
v. United States, 436 U.S. 238, 247 (1978) (“Sections 6672 and 7202 were designed to assure
compliance by the employer with its obligation to withhold and pay the sums withheld, by
subjecting the employer’s officials responsible for the employer’s decisions regarding withholding
and payment to civil and criminal penalties for the employer’s delinquency.”); United States v.
Hartman, 896 F.3d 759, 761 (6th Cir. 2018) (discussing responsible person liability).
137. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 12-414a (2020) (imposing personal sales tax liability upon
“any officer or employee of any corporation . . . and a member or employee of any partnership or
limited liability company who, as such officer, employee or member, is under a duty” to collect
and pay sales tax); TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-1-1443 (2020) (imposing personal sales tax liability
upon “an officer or employee of a corporation who, as such officer or employee, is under a duty”
to collect and pay sales taxes); Yik C. Lo v. Comm’r of Revenue, Nos. 8359-R, 8454-R, 2016 Minn.
Tax LEXIS 17, at *24–25 (Minn. T.C., Apr. 7, 2016) (discussing responsible person liability for
state sales taxes).
138. Buscaglia, supra note 118, at 131–32.
139. Id.
140. See John DeRoss, Jr., Note, Misclassification of Employees as Independent Contractors
in Indiana: A State Legislative Solution, 50 IND. L. REV. 673, 674 (2017).
141. Id. at 675.
142. Id. at 692–93 (quoting 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 185/60 (LexisNexis 2016)).
143. Id. at 694.
144. Id. at 694–95.
145. DAVID WEIL, THE FISSURED WORKPLACE: WHY WORK BECAME SO BAD FOR SO MANY
AND WHAT CAN BE DONE TO IMPROVE IT 7 (2014).
146. Id. at 9.
147. Id. at 180.
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all-encompassing employer are divided among and subcontracted to “multiple
organizations.”148 This causes the contemporary workplace to be “fissured”
among different employing entities.149
To take a simple case, consider the Dynamex driver who hires and pays her
own workers. These second-tier drivers are employed by the first-tier driver
who has a direct relationship with Dynamex. These second-tier drivers, while
not immediately employed by Dynamex, are nevertheless part of the broader
Dynamex enterprise and are regulated by the policies Dynamex imposes upon
the first-tier driver with which Dynamex has a direct relationship. These secondtier drivers may wear Dynamex uniforms150 and may place the Dynamex logo
on their delivery trucks151 even though their paychecks come not from Dynamex
itself, but from the first-tier driver who receives her payments from Dynamex.
Or consider the employees of a fast-food franchisee. These employees receive
their paychecks and direct supervision from the franchisee who operates the
restaurant at which these employees work.152 But these employees wear the
franchisor’s uniforms and implement policies that the franchisor imposes upon
the franchisee.153
Many situations in the fissured workplace are more complex than these cases.
Frequently, corporations, which in an earlier age directly employed individuals
to perform a variety of functions, today subcontract those functions to “multiple
organizations.”154 Customers and other members of the public are typically
unaware that persons with whom they interact are actually employed by these
entities with subcontracts because these persons appear to the public to be
employees of the corporation that has outsourced its staffing function. The rise
of the fissured workplace has placed new pressure on the concept of “joint
employment”155 under which two related entities, e.g., franchisor and franchisee,
might both be deemed to be employers of the persons who are controlled by the
franchisee subject to the overriding supervision of the franchisor.

148. Id. at 7.
149. Id.
150. See Dynamex Operations W., Inc. v. Superior Court, 416 P.3d 1, 8 (Cal. 2018).
151. Id.
152. Kati L. Griffith, An Empirical Study of Fast-Food Franchising Contracts: Toward a New
“Intermediary” Theory of Joint Employment, 94 WASH. L. REV. 171, 173, 179, 213 (2019).
153. See id. at 190–91.
154. See WEIL, supra note 145, at 7.
155. See, e.g., Browning-Ferris Indus. of Cal. v. NLRB, 911 F.3d 1195, 1199–200 (D.C. Cir.
2018) (considering the appropriate analysis in determining “joint-employer status”); 29 C.F.R. §
791.1 (2019). See also Ben Penn, States Can Advance Challenge Over DOL Joint Employer Rule:
Judge, BLOOMBERG LAW NEWS (June 2, 2020, 5:25 PM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/dailylabor-report/states-can-advance-challenge-over-dol-joint-employer-rule-judge.
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As part of his program for “mending”156 the fissured workplace, Dean Weil
highlights a variety of legislative proposals157 and enforcement practices.158
Among these are the ABC definition of employment.159
In a similar fashion, Attorneys Anna Deknatel and Lauren Hoff-Downing
consider a variety of state responses to the “rampant culture of misclassification”
in which employees are erroneously characterized as independent contractors.160
They support the ABC test along with enhanced penalties for worker
misclassification.161
Attorneys Deknatel and Hoff-Downing catalogue the different ways in which
various states have formulated the ABC test.162 After reviewing these varied
versions of the ABC formula, they endorse “[r]evising statutes towards [the
ABC] test [as] a particularly effective measure when it creates a set of laws that
provide one independent contracting definition across all workers.”163
Professor Katherine V.W. Stone characterizes the evolution of the
contemporary workplace as “the decline of [the] standard contract of
employment.”164 According to Professor Stone, “[t]he employment relationship
is being transformed from a long-term stable relationship between an employee
and a firm to one in which the employee is a free agent operating in a
boundaryless workplace.”165 Central to this transformation has been the legal
characterization of workers as independent contractors: “[t]he test for
independent contractor status is broad, so many who depend on a particular
employer for their livelihood are classified as independent contractors and
deprived of all employment law protections.”166
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) shares the consensus belief
that “[t]he common law rules for classifying workers are unclear and subject to
conflicting interpretations,”167 in part because “the tests used to determine

156. WEIL, supra note 145, at 20–23.
157. Id. at 203–213.
158. Id. at 221–242
159. Id. at 204–05
160. Deknatel & Hoff-Downing, supra note 80, at 55.
161. Id. at 61.
162. Id. at 67–73.
163. Id. at 101.
164. Katherine V.W. Stone, The Decline of the Standard Contract of Employment in the United
States: A Socio-Regulatory Perspective, in RETHINKING WORKPLACE REGULATION: BEYOND THE
STANDARD CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT 58 (Katherine V.W. Stone & Harry Arthurs eds., 2013).
165. Id.
166. Id. at 74.
167. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO/T-GGD-96-130, TAX ADMINISTRATION:
ISSUES IN CLASSIFYING WORKERS AS EMPLOYEES OR INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS 1 (1996),
https://www.gao.gov/assets/110/106546.pdf.
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whether a worker is an independent contractor or an employee are complex and
differ from law to law.”168
In short, the commentary is largely critical of the current law of employee
status, characterizing the law as too complex, too imprecise, and too limited,
particularly in the context of the modern “gig economy.” The legal
commentators call for definitions of employee status that are simpler, more
uniform, and more comprehensive. As I discuss infra, A.B.5 demonstrates the
tensions among these concerns.
III. DESCRIBING A.B.5
Against this background, California adopted A.B.5. This statute purports to
codify Dynamex and the ABC test for the purposes of the California Labor and
Unemployment Insurance Codes and for all wage orders of the California
Industrial Welfare Commission.169 However, A.B.5 creates so many exceptions
to Dynamex and the ABC standard that A.B.5 can just as plausibly be
characterized as a partial codification of Borello and its test for employee status.
Moreover, A.B.5 does not address the issue of employee status in the tort context
and has inconsistent implications for employee status in the state tax setting.
Section 2 of A.B.5170 declares, as a general rule, that employee status is to be
determined under the ABC test for purposes of California’s Labor and
Unemployment Insurance Codes and for the wage orders of California’s
Industrial Welfare Commission.171 Consequently for these purposes, any
“person providing labor or services for remuneration shall” presumptively “be
168. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-09-717, EMPLOYEE MISCLASSIFICATION:
IMPROVED COORDINATION, OUTREACH, AND TARGETING COULD BETTER ENSURE DETECTION
AND PREVENTION 3 (2009), https://www.gao.gov/assets/300/293679.pdf.
169. Cal. Assemb. B. 5, Leg. Couns. Dig. A.B.5 also amended the provisions of the California
Labor Code pertaining to Workers’ Compensation and Insurance as well as provisions of the
California Unemployment Insurance Code. See id. §§ 3–5. A.B.5 also authorized the California
attorney general, as well as city attorneys and prosecutors, to pursue injunctive relief “to prevent
the continued misclassification of employees as independent contractors . . . .” Id. § 2 (adding §
2750.3(j) to the California Labor Code).
170. Id. (adding § 2750.3 to the California Labor Code). A ballot measure to repeal A.B.5 will
be voted upon by the California electorate this November. Hannah Wiley, Uber, Lyft and
DoorDash Initiative Seeking Labor Law Exemption Heads to California Voters, THE SACRAMENTO
BEE (May 22, 2020, 6:54 PM), https://www.sacbee.com/news/politics-government/capitolalert/article242948676.html. In the meanwhile, California is suing Uber and Lyft about the
employee status of their drivers. See Paul Jones, California Seeks Injunction Against Uber, Lyft
Over Worker Status, Taxes, TAX NOTES (June 26, 2020), https://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notestoday-state/litigation-and-appeals/california-seeks-injunction-against-uber-lyft-over-workerstatus-taxes/2020/06/26/2cnm0. The California Superior Court has ruled for California, but the
trial court’s injunction has been suspended by the Court of Appeals. See People v. Uber Techs.,
Inc., No. CGC-20-584402 at 32 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 10, 2020) (order granting preliminary
injunction). See also Joel Rosenblatt, Uber, Lyft Win Delay on Converting Drivers to Employees,
BLOOMBERG LAW NEWS (Aug. 20, 2020, 4:59 PM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-laborreport/uber-lyft-win-delay-on-order-converting-drivers-to-employees.
171. Cal. Assemb. B. 5 § 2 (adding § 2750.3(a)(1) to the California Labor Code).
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considered an employee rather than an independent contractor unless the hiring
entity demonstrates” compliance with all three factors of the ABC test172:
(A) The person is free from the control and direction of the hiring
entity in connection with the performance of the work, both under the
contract for the performance of the work and in fact.
(B) The person performs work that is outside the usual course of the
hiring entity’s business.
(C) The person is customarily engaged in an independently established
trade, occupation, or business of the same nature as that involved in
the work performed.173
However, having made this broad statement, A.B.5 then exempts numerous
professions and occupations from the ABC test, thereby leaving these
professions and occupations subject to Borello.174
The exemptions of A.B.5 are detailed and daunting. The exempted
professions and occupations (subject to Borello rather than the ABC test for
employee status) include licensed insurance personnel;175 licensed
“physician[s,] dentist[s], podiatrist[s], psychologist[s, and] veterinarian[s]”;176
licensed “lawyer[s], architect[s], engineer[s], private investigator[s, and]
accountant[s]”;177 registered broker-dealers and investment advisors;178 certain
“direct sales salesperson[s]”179 and commercial fishers;180 specific providers of
marketing;181 human resources services;182 certain travel agents;183 graphic
designers;184 “[g]rant writer[s]”;185 “[f]ine artist[s]”;186 “enrolled agent[s]”
authorized to practice before the IRS;187 a “[p]ayment processing agent through

172. Id. (adding § 2750.3(a)(1) to the California Labor Code).
173. Id. (adding § 2750.3(a)(1)(A)–(C) to the California Labor Code).
174. Id. (adding §§ 2750.3(b) through 2750.3(h), inclusive, to the California Labor Code). In
an unfortunate drafting decision, A.B.5 incorporates Borello by reference. See id. As I observe
infra pp.42–43, this decision is problematic since it is unclear whether this statutory reference is
intended to incorporate the two-part test enunciated in Borello (control plus statutory purpose) or
whether this reference is intended to reflect Dyanmex’s subsequent gloss on Borello (which
emphasizes statutory purpose).
175. Id. § 2 (adding § 2750.3(b)(1) to the California Labor Code).
176. Id. (adding § 2750.3(b)(2) to the California Labor Code).
177. Id. (adding § 2750.3(b)(3) to the California Labor Code).
178. Id. (adding § 2750.3(b)(4) to the California Labor Code).
179. Id. (adding § 2750.3(b)(5) to the California Labor Code).
180. Id. (adding § 2750.3(b)(6) to the California Labor Code).
181. Id. (adding § 2750.3(c)(2)(B)(i) to the California Labor Code).
182. Id. (adding § 2750.3(c)(2)(B)(ii) to the California Labor Code).
183. Id. (adding § 2750.3(c)(2)(B)(iii) to the California Labor Code).
184. Id. (adding § 2750.3(c)(2)(B)(iv) to the California Labor Code).
185. Id. (adding § 2750.3(c)(2)(B)(v) to the California Labor Code).
186. Id. (adding § 2750.3(c)(2)(B)(vi) to the California Labor Code).
187. Id. (adding § 2750.3(c)(2)(B)(vii) to the California Labor Code).
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an independent sales organization”;188 certain photographers and
photojournalists;189 specified “freelance writer[s], editor[s] or newspaper
cartoonist[s]”;190 licensed estheticians, electrologists, manicurists, barbers and
cosmetologists who meet detailed requirements;191 licensed real estate agents;192
licensed repossession agents;193 “bona fide business-to-business contracting
relationship[s]” meeting certain standards;194 specified construction
subcontractors;195 a “referral agency” and a “service provider” receiving a
referral if the referral agency meets certain standards and connects clients with
providers of “graphic design, photography, tutoring, event planning, minor
home repair, moving, home cleaning, errands, furniture assembly, animal
services, dog walking, dog grooming, web design, picture hanging, pool
cleaning, or yard cleanup” services;196 and motor clubs, along with certain of
their service providers.197 As I note below, many of these statutory exceptions
are intricate with unclear boundaries.198
A.B.5 has no impact on an individual’s status as an employee vel non in the
tort context. Thus, it is possible for an individual to be an employee for purposes
of the ABC test embodied in A.B.5, but simultaneously be an independent
contractor for tort law purposes under the common law control test.
A.B.5’s impact in the state tax context is uneven. On the one hand, A.B.5
applies the ABC test for purposes of determining whether an individual is an
employee for state wage withholding purposes.199 On the other hand, A.B.5 does
not apply more generally to the California tax code. Hence, it is possible for a
worker to be an employee for purposes of state wage withholding under the ABC
test while being an independent contractor for other state income tax purposes.
Suppose, for example, that a California business provides health care
coverage for an individual who qualifies as an employee under the ABC test but
not under the common law control standard. In this case, the business must
withhold California income tax from the compensation it pays this individual
188. Id. (adding § 2750.3(c)(2)(B)(viii) to the California Labor Code).
189. Id. (adding § 2750.3(c)(2)(B)(ix) to the California Labor Code).
190. Id. (adding § 2750.3(c)(2)(B)(x) to the California Labor Code).
191. Id. (adding § 2750.3(c)(2)(B)(xi) to the California Labor Code).
192. Id. (adding § 2750.3(d)(1) to the California Labor Code).
193. Id. (adding § 2750.3(d)(2) to the California Labor Code).
194. Id. (adding § 2750.3(e) to the California Labor Code).
195. Id. (adding § 2750.3(f) to the California Labor Code).
196. Id. (adding § 2750.3(g) to the California Labor Code).
197. Id. (adding § 2750.3(h) to the California Labor Code).
198. See infra Section V.C.
199. A.B.5 does not apply to the California Revenue & Tax Code. However, California’s
statute requiring employers to undertake personal income tax withholding on the wages they pay is
codified in Unemployment Insurance Code § 13020. A.B.5 does apply the ABC test to the
Unemployment Insurance Code and hence to the income tax withholding obligation codified
therein. See Cal. Assemb. B. 5 § 2 (adding to the Labor Code § 27503.3(a)(1), which applies the
ABC test to the Unemployment Insurance Code).
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because she is an employee under the wage withholding provisions of the
Unemployment Insurance Code as modified by A.B.5. However, this individual
cannot exclude the cost of her health care coverage from state gross income as
she remains an independent contractor for general income tax purposes.200
IV. EVALUATING A.B.5
A. Overview
A.B.5 is neither the panacea some of its advocates maintain nor the tragedy
its opponents bemoan. This section emphasizes four features of A.B.5. First,
the ABC test incorporated into A.B.5 has its own interpretative challenges.
These ambiguities include the “control” standard,201 which the ABC inquiry
borrows from the common law test of employee status, as well as such
contestable notions as whether a worker “is customarily engaged in an
independently established trade, occupation, or business”202 or “performs work
that is outside the usual course of the hiring entity’s business.”203
Second, as we have just seen, A.B.5 is replete with exemptions and
exceptions. The boundaries of these exemptions and exceptions are often
opaque. Third, it was an unfortunate drafting choice to repeatedly incorporate
by reference Borello rather than stating in explicit statutory terms the rule the
drafters of A.B.5 believe that Borello embodies.204 Fourth, A.B.5 has no impact
on an individual’s status as an employee for tort purposes and an uneven impact
on an individual’s status as an employee for state tax purposes. It is thus
possible, for example, for an individual to be an employee under A.B.5 for
purposes of the Golden State’s employment-based protection laws while being
an independent contractor for the tort rule of respondeat superior. Whatever the
merits of A.B.5 might be, simplicity, clarity, and uniformity are not among these.
B. The Ambiguities of the ABC Test
Critics of the common law control test bemoan the uncertainties of that factintensive, multifactor test.205 However, the ABC test is no model of clarity
either. Most obviously, the ABC test incorporates as prong A the standard of
control. That standard entails the same uncertainties and imprecisions under the
ABC test as it does under the common law inquiry: how much authority must

200. See I.R.C. § 106(a) (excluding employer-based health coverage from an employee’s gross
income, incorporated for California personal income tax purposes by CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE §
17131 (Deering 2020)).
201. Cal. Assemb. B. 5 § 2 (adding § 2750.3(a)(1)(A) to the California Labor Code).
202. Id. (adding § 2750.3(a)(1)(C) to the California Labor Code).
203. Id. (adding § 2750.3(a)(1)(B) to the California Labor Code).
204. Id. (adding §§ 2750.3(b), 2750.3(c)(1), 2750.3(d)(1), 2750.3(e)(1), 2750.3(f),
2750.3(g)(1) and 2750.3(h) to the California Labor Code).
205. See supra Section II.
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the hiring person have and exercise to constitute “control” over the person hired?
How are multifactor tests for control to be applied in particular cases?
Sometimes, “control” is easily determined but often it is not, particularly in
the modern economy of the “fissured” workplace where multiple persons and
entities may each possess and exercise some authority over the worker whose
status as an employee vel non is being determined.206 Consider, for example, an
individual hired by a Dynamex driver. Is this second-tier driver controlled by
Dynamex via the quality standards Dynamex imposes directly upon its first-tier
drivers; or is this second-tier driver controlled by the first-tier driver who stands
between Dynamex and the second-tier driver? If both Dynamex and the firsttier driver “control” the second-tier driver, is that driver an employee of both
Dynamex and the first-tier driver? The answers to these questions under the
ABC test are no more apparent than they are under the common law control test
for employee status. The presumption of employee status under the ABC test
shifts the burden of overcoming these uncertainties onto the hiring person, who
must prove the absence of legal and practical control to establish independent
contractor status of the person hired. But the uncertainties of the multifactor
control test remain.
In these and other situations, “control” for purposes of the ABC standard will
be governed by the same kinds of multifactor tests promulgated under Rev. Rul.
87-41207 and the Restatement of Agency.208 Those multifactor inquiries will
yield no more certainty as part of the ABC rubric than they do under the common
law control test.
Similar ambiguities arise under prong B of the ABC test. Prong B requires
determination of the hiring entity’s business: to be an independent contractor
rather than an employee, the service provider must “perform[] work that is
outside the usual course of the hiring entity’s business.”209 Often it is easy to
determine that entity’s business, but, again, in the modern economy, matters can
frequently be more complex.
Consider, for example, an online platform that matches persons who want to
perform janitorial services with persons who need janitorial services. Is that
platform in the janitorial services business for purposes of prong B or is the
platform’s business online matching? That characterization is critical under
prong B of the ABC test because, to satisfy that prong, the worker to be classified
as an independent contractor must provide services “outside the usual course of
the hiring entity’s business.”210
If the online platform is deemed to be in the janitorial services business, then
the worker providing such services falls within “the hiring entity’s business.” If,

206.
207.
208.
209.
210.

WEIL, supra note 145, at 20–22.
Rev. Rul. 87-41, 1987-1 C.B. 296, at 10–18.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.07(3)(a), cmt. b, cmt. f (AM. LAW INST. 2006).
Cal. Assemb. B. 5 § 2 (adding § 2750.3(a)(1)(B) to the California Labor Code).
Id.
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on the other hand, the online platform is characterized as conducting an internet
matching business, then the worker providing janitorial services is, for purposes
of prong B, “outside” the platform’s business because the worker is a janitor, not
a computer matching service.
Consider in this context the decision under prong B in Q.D.-A., Inc. v. Indiana
Department of Workforce Development.211 In Q.D.-A, Inc., the hiring entity was
a company which “matches drivers with customers who need large vehicles
driven to them.”212 Indiana’s Supreme Court concluded that for purposes of the
ABC test, the company and the drivers conduct different businesses because the
company matching drivers and customers does not itself “provide drive-away
services.”213
This construction of prong B stands in contrast to the position of those who
contend that A.B.5’s codification of the ABC test classifies Uber and Lyft
drivers as employees.214 Q.D.-A, Inc.’s business model is similar to Uber’s and
Lyft’s, that is, computer-based matching of transportation service providers and
transportation customers. The Indiana court found that for purposes of prong B
such customer-matching is a different business than is conducted by the drivers
themselves.
Prong C of the ABC test is, depending on one’s perspective, intuitive or
tautological: to be an independent contractor, a person providing services must
be “engaged in an independently established trade, occupation, profession or
business[.]”215 This comes close to saying that an independent contractor is a
contractor who conducts independent activity. Again, over time case law will
emerge, but, in the meanwhile, the concept of an independent business will be
contested for purposes of prong C. There is, moreover, no assurance that, for
the long run, different state courts will construe the concept of an independent
business in the same way. Indeed, there is a good chance that they will not.
Consider again in this context the facts of Dynamex.216 In light of the
interpretive ambiguities of the ABC test as codified in A.B.5, California courts
could construe the ABC test in a way that classifies all Dynamex drivers as
employees, including those drivers who engage other persons to work for them
and those drivers who also work for other delivery services or for their own
account. If under prong A, Dynamex is deemed to exercise control over every
driver who is delivering for Dynamex, then no driver overcomes the
presumption of employee status because Dynamex exercises such control even
if a driver also employs others. Dynamex exercises such control while the driver
211. Q.D.-A., Inc. v. Ind. Dep’t Workforce Dev., 114 N.E.3d 840, 845 (Ind. 2019).
212. Id. at 842.
213. Id. at 848.
214. See e.g., Ghaffary & Campbell, supra note 3; Canon, supra note 3; Conger & Scheiber,
supra note 3 (“The bill was not universally supported by drivers. Some opposed it because they
worried it would make it hard to keep a flexible schedule.”).
215. Cal. Assemb. B. 5 § 2 (adding § 2750.3(a)(1)(C) to the California Labor Code).
216. Dynamex Operations W., Inc. v. Superior Court, 416 P.3d 1 (Cal. 2018).
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works for Dynamex, even though she works for other delivery companies on her
own time. The upshot under this scenario is that all Dynamex drivers are
employees because Dynamex exercises control as to all of them.
In yet another scenario, California’s courts could apply the ABC test, now
codified in A.B.5, in a way that classifies Dynamex drivers as employees when
they work full-time for Dynamex by themselves, but which classifies the
remaining Dynamex drivers as independent contractors. In this setting,
Dynamex is deemed to exercise no control over any drivers. Full-time Dynamex
drivers would nevertheless be Dynamex employees because they do not have
any independent business for purposes of prong C. Thus, under this scenario,
full-time drivers are Dynamex employees because, lacking any independent
business, the statutory presumption of employee status remains intact. On the
other hand, drivers who deliver for other companies or for their own account
would under this approach satisfy prong C and would thus be independent
contractors because they have independent businesses.
A situation in which some Dynamex drivers are employees and some are not
would pose administrability challenges for Dynamex and other similarly situated
California employers. Such a situation would also be confusing for the drivers
themselves and for those charged with the enforcement of California labor law.
As different drivers shift their work patterns—from full-time to part-time,
sometimes engaging other workers and sometimes not, at times working for
other delivery services and at other times not—Dynamex (and any employer
with a similar business model) would be expected to monitor and assess these
changes as drivers would continually shift from employee status to independent
contractor status and back again.
In short, those hoping for greater clarity and simplicity in the law cannot take
comfort from A.B.5’s adoption of the ABC test. Whatever the merits of the
ABC test may be, that test does not eliminate interpretive challenges in
determining employee status. Rather, the ABC standard introduces new
interpretative challenges to the determination of employee status.
C. The Ambiguous Boundaries of A.B.5’s Exemptions
As we have seen, A.B.5 is replete with exemptions and exceptions.217 The
boundaries of these statutory exemptions and exceptions are often opaque.
To take one example, consider A.B.5’s exemption from the ABC test for
certain persons who perform “[m]arketing” services.218 To satisfy this
exemption, an individual performing marketing services must, inter alia,
undertake “work [that] is original and creative in character and the result of
which depends primarily on the invention, imagination, or talent of the
217. See Cal. Assemb. B. 5 § 2 (adding §§ 2750.3(b)(1)-(6), 2750.3(c)(2)(B)(i)-(xi),
2750.3(d)(1)-(2), 2750.3(e), 2750.3(f), 2750.3(g), 2750.3(g)(2)(C), and 2750.3(h) to the California
Labor Code).
218. Id. (adding § 2750.3(c)(2)(B)(i) to the California Labor Code).
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[individual] . . . .”219 Over time, a body of case law may emerge that provides
guidance under this fact-specific standard. But in the short-run, more likely for
the long-run, it will often be unclear whether marketing activity is “creative”
enough or “imaginative” enough to qualify a marketer as an independent
contractor for purposes of this A.B.5 exemption.
A.B.5’s exemption from the ABC test for specified persons performing
marketing services is part of a broader statutory exemption for a variety of
“professional services” providers.220 Among the criteria for this broader
exemption is that the professional service provider “customarily and regularly
exercises discretion and independent judgment in the performance of the
services.”221 This statutory language derives from the U.S. Department of Labor
(DOL) regulations under FLSA. Under the DOL regulations, one factor
determining whether an individual is an administrative employee exempt from
FLSA’s overtime pay requirements is whether the employee “exercise[s] . . .
discretion and independent judgment with respect to matters of significance.”222
In 2001, California’s Industrial Welfare Commission incorporated this standard
into its Wage Order 4-2001.223 In light of this history, when California courts
construe A.B.5’s statutory exemption for certain professional service providers,
they can logically look to the federal regulations defining “discretion and
independent judgment” for FLSA purposes,224 as well as to the decisions of the
federal225 and California226 courts applying this standard under the FLSA and
Wage Order 4-2001.
However, the courts caution that their decisions applying the “discretion and
independent judgment” test are “fact-intensive,”227 focusing upon the “totalityof-the-circumstances.”228 Even with interpretive guidance from the DOL’s
overtime regulations and the existing federal and state case law, the standard of
“discretion and independent judgment” is open-ended. It will take much time
for definitive signposts to emerge for purposes of A.B.5’s “discretion and
judgment standard”—if such signposts ever emerge.

219. Id.
220. Id. (adding § 2750.3(c) to the California Labor Code).
221. Id. (adding § 2750.3(c)(1)(F) to the California Labor Code).
222. 29 C.F.R. § 541.200(a)(3) (2020).
223. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 8, § 11040.1(A)(2)(b) (2020) (defining an administrative
employee as one “[w]ho customarily and regularly exercises discretion and independent
judgment”).
224. 29 C.F.R. § 541.202 (2019).
225. See, e.g., Perry v. Randstad Gen. Partner (US) LLC, 876 F.3d 191, 196–97 (6th Cir. 2017).
226. See, e.g., Combs v. Skyriver Commc’ns, Inc., 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d 171, 1251–52, 1254, 1256–
57 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).
227. Perry, 876 F.3d at 200.
228. Id. at 208.
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Take a third example: A.B.5’s exemption from the ABC test for “freelance
writer[s], editor[s and] newspaper cartoonist[s].”229 This exemption only applies
if the writer, editor, or cartoonist “provide[s] content submissions to the putative
employer . . . 35 times” or fewer per year.230 For purposes of this test, “[i]tems
of content produced on a recurring basis related to a general topic shall be
considered separate submissions for purposes of calculating the 35 times per
year.”231
The drafters of A.B.5 could plausibly have decided that these and other
ambiguities232 were necessary as a matter of policy or politics or both. However,
that drafting decision disappoints the expectations of those commentators
seeking enhanced clarity and simplicity as to the legal definition of employment
status. Challenging interpretive issues arise under A.B.5’s exemptions from the
ABC test. Those who criticize current law as unclear, overly complex, and
lacking uniformity can take no solace from A.B.5.
D. Incorporating Borello233
A.B.5 repeatedly and explicitly incorporates by reference Borello.234 This
drafting decision is problematic since it is unclear whether this statutory
reference is intended to incorporate the original two-part test of Borello (control
plus statutory purpose) or whether this reference is intended to reflect
Dyanmex’s subsequent gloss on Borello (which emphasizes more heavily
statutory purpose when determining an individual’s status vel non as an
employee).235

229. Cal. Assemb. B. 5 § 2(adding § 2750.3(c)(2)(B)(x) to the California Labor Code). A.B.5’s
treatment of freelance writers has proved particularly contentious. See, e.g., Philip Garrity, We
Polled 573 Freelancers About AB5. They’re Not Happy, THE FREELANCER (Jan. 30, 2020),
https://contently.net/2020/01/30/resources/we-polled-573-freelancers-about-ab5-theyre-nothappy/; Matt Charnock, California, Leave Freelance Journalists Alone, THE BOLD ITALIC (Jan. 7,
2020),
https://thebolditalic.com/ab-5-threatens-the-future-of-journalism-in-california-and-mycareer-6c4321b6db05; Katie Kilkenny “Everybody Is Freaking Out”: Freelance Writers Scramble
to Make Sense of New California Law, THE HOLLYWOOD REP. (Oct. 17, 2019, 10:34 AM),
https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/everybody-is-freaking-freelance-writers-scramblemake-sense-new-california-law-1248195. See also William Hays Weissman, A.B.5 Versus
Corporate Form, 95 TAX NOTES 955 (2020), https://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notesstate/employment-taxes/ab-5-versus-corporateform/2020/03/16/2c7nf?highlight=william%20hays%20weissman.
230. Cal. Assemb. B. 5 § 2 (adding § 2750.3(c)(2)(B)(x) to the California Labor Code).
231. Id.
232. See, e.g., id. (adding § 2750.3(c)(2)(B)(ii) to the California Labor Code) (exempting an
“[a]dministrator of human resources” if “the contracted work is predominantly intellectual and
varied in character and is of such character that the output produced or the result accomplished
cannot be standardized in relation to a given period of time”).
233. S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Dep’t of Indus. Rel., 769 P.2d 399 (Cal. 1989).
234. See Cal. Assemb. B. 5, Leg. Couns. Dig, § 2.
235. See discussion supra Sections I.D., I.E.
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In particular cases, the two interpretations of Borello can point to contrasting
conclusions. Consider, for example, a situation in which a court concludes that,
on the facts of the case, there is a weak argument for employee status under the
common law control test, but there is a strong argument for employee status in
light of statutory purpose. The original text of Borello is unclear as to what the
court should do in this situation because in this hypothetical example the two
relevant factors—control and statutory purpose—pull in opposite directions.
On the other hand, Dynamex’s realignment of Borello indicates that statutory
purpose should be the dominant consideration in determining employee
status.236 Hence, adhering to this interpretation of Borello, the outcome in this
hypothetical situation is employee, rather than independent contractor, status
because statutory purpose predominates. Unfortunately, the drafting decision to
incorporate Borello by name provides no guidance as to which version of
Borello applies.
Incorporating Borello by name into A.B.5 may have been a drafting glitch.
Alternatively, incorporating Borello into the statute in this fashion could have
implemented a political compromise, explicit or implicit, necessary to secure the
law’s passage. If the potential supporters of A.B.5 could not agree among
themselves which version of Borello to endorse—control plus statutory purpose
or just statutory purpose by itself—citing to Borello enabled both sides to
support the resulting legislation in the hope of prevailing in the subsequent
regulatory and judicial processes.
Whether citing Borello by name was a poor drafting choice or “a child born
of the silent union of legislative compromise,”237 the result is more uncertainty
as to the contours of A.B.5 since the statute leaves it unclear which version of
Borello controls under A.B.5.
E. Tort and Tax Status
Another salient aspect of A.B.5 is the dog that didn’t bark:238 A.B.5 is silent
on the subject of employee status in the context of torts. A.B.5 thus disappoints
those seeking greater uniformity in the legal definition of employment because
an individual can be an employee for purposes of A.B.5 and California labor law
while that same individual is still an independent contractor for tort purposes.
Suppose, for example, that a freelance writer provides thirty-six annual
submissions to a publisher, which does not control this writer, in the provision
of his writing services. Suppose further that furnishing these thirty-six
submissions is a full-time occupation for the writer who works exclusively for
this publisher.

236. Dynamex Operations W., Inc. v. Superior Court, 416 P.3d 1, 19–20 (Cal. 2018).
237. Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 412 (1970).
238. ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE, The Adventure of Silver Blaze, in THE MEMOIRS OF SHERLOCK
HOLMES 10, 34 (Elecbook 2000) (1894) (ebook) (“[Gregory:] ‘The dog did nothing in the nighttime.’ [Holmes:] ‘That was the curious incident.’”).
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On these facts, the writer is an employee for purposes of the ABC test, and
the California Labor Code because the writer has no “independently established
trade, occupation, or business[.]”239 He works full-time for one publisher and is
not available for work for others. This writer does not qualify for A.B.5’s
exemption for freelance writers because he completes too many articles each
year.240 Hence, for purposes of A.B.5, the statutory presumption of employee
status prevails as to this writer.
However, for tort purposes, this writer is an independent contractor because,
in the tort setting, the common law control test remains in effect, and the
publisher exercises no control over this writer. If, for example, this writer libels
someone in a column, the publisher has no respondeat superior liability for this
tort—even though the publisher may have its own liability as publisher and even
though the publisher is this writer’s employer for purposes of California labor
law.
This outcome may, as a matter of policy, be plausible because the tort law
uses employee status for different purposes than that status serves in the context
of protective legislation. However, this outcome frustrates the expectations of
those seeking uniformity across the law in defining who is an employee.
Similar observations apply in the tax context. As noted earlier, the impact of
A.B.5 in the California tax context is uneven.241 A.B.5 controls for wage
withholding purposes but not for other tax purposes. Thus, this writer is an
employee for state wage withholding but not for other purposes of the Golden
State’s income tax statute. Again, supporters of A.B.5 can claim victory by
extending employee status for certain purposes of California law. They cannot
claim to have brought greater unity or simplicity to the definition of who is an
employee.
F. Conclusion
Whatever the merits of A.B.5 might be, uniformity, simplicity, and certainty
are not among these. The ABC test incorporated into A.B.5 has its own
interpretative challenges. Moreover, A.B.5 is replete with exemptions and
exceptions, the boundaries of which are often opaque. In addition, it was an
unfortunate choice to incorporate by reference Borello, rather than stating in
explicit statutory terms which interpretation of Borello A.B.5 embodies.
Whether that reference was a drafting mistake or a political compromise, it now
leaves an important ambiguity to be resolved by judicial and administrative
interpretation. Finally, A.B.5 has no impact on an individual’s status as an
employee for tort purposes and has an uneven impact in the tax context. This
leads to the possibility that an individual will be classified differently under
239. Cal. Assemb. B. 5 § 2 (adding § 2750.3(a)(1)(C) to the California Labor Code).
240. Id. (adding § 2750.3(c)(2)(B)(x) to the California Labor Code).
241. See supra notes 170, 199–200 and accompanying text; see also discussion supra Section
III.
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A.B.5’s ABC test than she will be classified for tax or tort purposes under the
common law control test.
V. GOING FORWARD FROM A.B.5: MUDDLING THROUGH THE TRADE-OFF
A.B.5 represents a significant, but limited, extension of employment-based
protection to certain California workers. However, A.B.5 does not make the law
of employee status clearer, simpler, or more uniform. Indeed, A.B.5 makes the
law more complex and less uniform than it was before. In this final section, I
argue that the policy considerations and political realities that led to this outcome
in California will recur in other states and in Congress. “Muddling through” in
this area is inevitable and is the best the law can do.
Consider the many exceptions of A.B.5. These may be understood as political
accommodations for particular industries, which, by means of such exceptions,
avoid the ABC test for their respective employees. These exceptions may also
be understood in policy terms as fine-tuning employee status in light of
compelling, industry-specific concerns. Both explanations may contain part of
the truth. These political realities and policy considerations, which molded the
extensive exceptions of A.B.5, will recur in other states and in Congress. Thus,
in those other states and on Capitol Hill, the outcomes will be similar to the
results in California: broadened labor protection purchased at the cost of more
complexity and less uniformity in the definition of who is an employee.
Consider in this context A.B.5’s exceptions from the ABC test for lawyers,
architects, engineers, and accountants.242 Those exceptions are straightforward:
all workers in these professions are automatically exempted from the ABC test
and are instead subject to the Borello standard for employee status.243 These
exceptions may reflect the political heft of the firms and individuals that practice
these professions. These firms may prefer to denominate as independent
contractors some of the professionals with whom they engage. Such firms’
political voices might have been significant in the legislative process resulting
in the adoption of A.B.5.
There is as well a policy rationale for A.B.5 extending less employment-based
protection to the members of these professions. Lawyers, engineers, architects,
and accountants may be deemed, by virtue of their educations and professional
statuses, to have greater bargaining power in the marketplace than do other, less
advantaged service providers. Because these professionals have greater ability
to protect themselves, the argument would go, they have less need of statutory
succor. Whether the political or the policy-based explanation is correct—and
they may both be—the same political realities and policy concerns that molded
A.B.5 will also influence legislative outcomes in other states and in Congress.

242. Cal. Assemb. B. 5 § 2 (adding § 2750.3(b)(3) to the California Labor Code).
243. As observed previously, this statutory reference leaves unclear which version of the
Borello test applies. See discussion supra Section IV.D.
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Contrast A.B.5’s straightforward exceptions from the ABC test for lawyers,
accountants, engineers, and architects with that statute’s narrower, more detailed
exceptions for manicurists, barbers, and cosmetologists.244 These service
providers are excepted from the ABC test, and thus governed by Borello only if
they can prove that they meet detailed standards including that the service
provider maintain a “separate” “business location,”245 “holds [herself] out to
other potential customers as available to perform the same type of work[,]”246
and “has the ability to set [her] own hours” of work247 and rate of
compensation.248
Both a political narrative and a policy saga may explain why A.B.5 gives these
service providers a more qualified exemption from the ABC test than that
legislation affords to lawyers, accountants, engineers, and architects. In political
terms, manicure, barber, and cosmetology businesses may have had less
lobbying weight in Sacramento than law, accounting, engineering, and
architectural firms. Thus, businesses engaging manicurists, barbers, and
cosmetologists achieved for themselves less relief from the burdens of the ABC
test. From a policy perspective, manicurists, barbers, and cosmetologists may
be perceived as having less bargaining power in the marketplace, and thus be in
greater need of legislative protection. Hence, the California legislature removed
these workers from the protection of the ABC test under more limited
circumstances. Both explanations may entail part of the story. In any event, the
outcome is more complexity and less uniformity in the definition of who is an
employee.
The trade-off reflected in A.B.5—more labor law protection for some workers
purchased at the price of greater complexity and less uniformity in the legal
definition of who is an employee—will occur in other states and in Congress if
and when they consider similar legislation to address the definition of who is an
employee. The same political forces and policy considerations that framed
A.B.5 will also be at work in those states and in Congress, resulting in similar
legislative choices and compromises.
There is, moreover, a compelling policy argument against uniformity in the
definition of an employee. The concept of “employee” plays diverse roles in
different legal settings. In the tax context, the category of “employee”
determines whether a payer or the corresponding payee is the proper party on
which to place withholding obligations and whether certain benefits extend to
taxpayers denominated for tax purposes as “employees.” In the tort setting, the
concept of “employee” identifies if there is a person to whom liability should be
244. Cal. Assemb. B. 5 § 2 (adding §§ 2750.3(b)(3) and 2750.3(c)(2)(B)(xi) to the California
Labor Code).
245. Id. (adding § 2750.3(c)(1)(A) to the California Labor Code). These criteria also apply to
the other service providers specified by this part of the statute.
246. Id. (adding § 2750.3(c)(1)(E) to the California Labor Code).
247. Id. (adding § 2750.3(c)(1)(D) to the California Labor Code).
248. Id. (adding § 2750.3(c)(1)(C) to the California Labor Code).
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extended under the doctrine of respondeat superior. In the regulatory context,
the term “employee” determines whether protective legislation should or should
not govern a person’s economic relationships. Given this diversity of
purposes,249 it may be sensible that some individuals are deemed to be
employees in one of these contexts but not in another.
Judge Frank observed tongue-in-cheek that, because the term “gift” has varied
meaning in different tax contexts, the law should distinguish “gift[s]” from
“gaft[s]” and “geft[s].”250 Judge Frank’s observation illuminates the choices the
law confronts when defining the term “employee.” There is important overlap,
but there are also important differences in the purpose of the term “employee”
in varied contexts. If we were starting from scratch today, we might use different
terms in each of these various settings to describe the relevant relationships. But
we are not starting from scratch.
Despite the strong scholarly emphasis on the need to simplify and unify the
definition of employee status,251 the prospect of greater uniformity and greater
simplicity in this area is a chimera. Given the different roles that the term
“employee” serves in different legal settings such as taxes, torts, and regulatory
protection, one size does not easily fit all when defining who is an employee.
The employee/independent contractor dichotomy reflects a deeply held
intuition, which, despite its foundational status, can be implemented in the
modern world only with great and detailed difficulty. A “hodgepodge”252 in this
area is the best the law can do, given how much work we now expect the concept
of “employee” to do.
A.B.5 emerged from the legislative process in the bluest of blue states. It is
hard to imagine that in other states, employer interests will have less influence
than they apparently had in California as A.B.5 was written. Legislation
emulating A.B.5 in other states and in Congress may well have more, rather than
fewer, industry-driven exceptions than those embedded in A.B.5.
Others might point to the difficulties manifested in A.B.5 and suggest that the
distinction between employees and independent contractors has outlived its
usefulness. Perhaps, for example, the time has come to impose tax withholding
obligations to include payments to persons today classified as independent
contractors. Similarly, from this vantage, protections against discrimination
now only applicable in the employment-based workplace should extend to a
broader set of economic transactions and relationships.

249. And, as previously noted, the concept of “employee” plays yet more roles in other areas
of the law such as copyright. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2018) (defining “work made for hire”); see also
discussion supra Part II.
250. Comm’r v. Beck’s Est., 129 F.2d 243, 246 (2d Cir. 1942).
251. See supra Section II.
252. Linder, supra note 23, at 158.
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Those favoring this future can cite as a model New York City’s recent—and
controversial—regulation of the ride-sharing industry.253 The N.Y.C. Taxi and
Limousine Commission (TLC) did not decide whether Uber and Lyft drivers
should be classified as drivers. Instead, it imposed regulations on the ridesharing industry without engaging in that debate. For those skeptical of the
continuing utility of the distinction between employees and independent
contractors, these TLC regulations are a harbinger of a future legal system,
which scraps that distinction or, at least, reduces its role.
Another possible harbinger of a future in which the concept of “employee”
plays a reduced role is Congress’s decision in response to the COVID-19 crisis
to permit states to extend unemployment compensation to independent
contractors.254
A final observation: A.B.5 leaves me skeptical of proposals for a third
category such as “dependent contractors”255 or “independent workers[.]”256
These categories will not obviate the need for or the inevitability of the kinds of
choices reflected in A.B.5. It is difficult to see how the use of these labels would
have made A.B.5 better while these labels would have introduced yet more
complexity into the law. More complexity makes the law more difficult to
enforce and more manipulable by those seeking to avoid compliance.
Two generations ago, Professor Charles E. Lindblom famously catalogued the
benefits of “muddling through.”257 Some problems do not lend themselves to
neat and comprehensive solutions. A.B.5 confirms that the legal definition of
employment is one of these. In many respects, it would be attractive if the legal
definition of who is an employee could be simplified and be made more uniform,
as many commentators urge. But, as A.B.5 demonstrates, this is not in the cards
nor should it be, given the various functions that employee status plays in
different areas of the law and the contending policy and political pressures

253. See, e.g., Important Changes to Driving in New York City, UBER BLOG (Sept. 12, 2019),
https://www.uber.com/blog/new-york-city/tlc-rule-changes/; Clayton Guse, TLC Approves Harsh
Regulations On Uber and Lyft, Aims to Reduce Street Congestion in Manhattan, N.Y. DAILY NEWS
(Aug. 7, 2019, 2:43 PM),
https://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/ny-20190807-btuxcy5qkne5tgoamwas3ob7lystory.html. See also Zehn-NY, LLC v. N.Y.C. Taxi & Limousine Comm’n., No. 159195/2019,
2019 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 6789 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 23, 2019); Tri-City, LLC v. N.Y.C. Taxi &
Limousine Comm’n., No. 159947/2019, 2019 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 6774 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 23,
2019).
254. Unemployment Insurance Relief During COVID-19 Outbreak, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR,
https://www.dol.gov/coronavirus/unemployment-insurance (“The CARES Act signed into law by
President Trump on March 27, 2020, gives states the option of extending unemployment
compensation to independent contractors and other workers who are ordinarily ineligible for
unemployment benefits.”) (last visited Oct. 18, 2020).
255. Linder, supra note 23, at 184–85.
256. Harris & Krueger, supra note 100, at 5, 9.
257. Lindblom, supra note 13.
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molding the law in this area. Whatever the merits of A.B.5 might be, uniformity,
simplicity, and certainty are not among these.
VI. CONCLUSION
A.B.5 is an important data point in the debate about defining who is an
employee in the modern economy. A.B.5 made a significant but limited
expansion of the coverage of California labor law, but at a notable cost. Even
as A.B.5 broadened the reach of the Golden State’s labor protections, A.B.5
made the definition of “employee” more complex and less uniform. Those
seeking federal or state legislation like A.B.5 will confront the same trade-off
under which greater coverage is achieved at the expense of more complexity and
less uniformity in the definition of who is an employee. The same political
forces and policy considerations, which molded A.B.5 in California, will have
similar effects in other states and in the halls of Congress.
For those who contend that the current law of employee status is too complex
and uncertain, A.B.5 makes matters worse. A.B.5 is replete with exceptions,
exemptions, and interpretive challenges that make the law of employee status
even more complicated and unclear. For those who seek expanded,
employment-based protection for workers in the modern economy, A.B.5 is an
important but limited victory. For these advocates of expanded employmentbased protection, the myriad exceptions and exemptions of A.B.5 are a sober
warning of the practical and political realities standing in the way of such
expanded protection. For those defending the status quo, A.B.5 should be an
equally sober warning of considerable dissatisfaction with this status quo.
In sum, the narrative of A.B.5 indicates that, given the political realities and
policy considerations, legislators can broaden the reach of employment-based
regulatory laws to cover more workers in the modern economy, or they can
simplify and unify the legal definition of employee status. They cannot do both.

